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NOTES AND COMMENT
apparent soundness. Such an impression is strengthened by .what has
been hitherto determined to be the law, that -the Legislature may not be
presumed to have made any innovation ipon the common law further
than is required by the mischief to be remedied.2 0 The purpose of the
Highway Law was to cure the remediless plight of a highway traveler
injured by a motor vehicle, other than the one in which he might be
traveling, through the recklessness of an irresponsible driver to whom
the owner had entrusted the vehicle and thereby made the accident
possible. 21 But in according this protection, it ddes not follow that the
common law rule of master and servant must be abrogated. The principle was already put in jeopardy by earlier judicial interpretation of the
section. 22 There was set in it an entering wedge that might have been
the beginning of its destruction. The Psola decision was imperative if
the rule was to be preserved.

V. J. M.
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Nnw YORK.-The new city court act for the city of New York I recently
has been the subject of judicial construction in the appellate term of the
supreme court, first department.2 The immediate point involved was the
validity of section 27 pi'oviding for the execution of the court's process
and mandates in any part of the state. 3 Service of a summons was made
upon the defendant in the city of Albany where he resided and had his
place of business. A motion was made to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the said court had no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant and that it had no power to serve its process beyond the city
limits. Respondent contended that the provision that the city court
should have original jurisdiction concurrent with the supreme court in
the class of actions enumerated 4 empowered the city court to issue its
process throughout the State. Held, Section 27 of the act was unconstitutional so far as it authorized the service of mandates indiscriminately in every part of the State because it -transcended the jurisdiction
"0 De~n .. Metropolitan R. Co., 119 N. Y. 540, 547; 23 N.E. 1054 (1890).
-'Spranote 17, at p. 210.
2
Sopra note 12.
)N. Y. Laws 1926, ch.. 539, enacted under authority of constitutional
amendment (art. 6, sec. 15) approved by the people at the general election
held Nov. 3rd, 1925. in effect Jan. 1st. 1926.
-American II istorical Society Inc. v. Glenn, 131 Misc. 291 (1928).
3N. Y. City Court Act §27, provides that "all process and mandates of
the court may be executed in any part of the State."
4Ibid. §16.
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prescribed by the constitution.5 The three justices comprising the
appellate term were unanimous (in separate opinions) that the city
court had no jurisdiction to issue a summons outside of the city of
New York.
Cases of assaults on the constitutional and jurisdictional limitations
of courts are by no means lacking in the law books, but the principal
case appears to be the first tested by in appellate tribunal involving
the power of the New York City Court under the new act to execute
its mandates beyond the city limits. Prior thereto it had been held by
one of its own justices that the court could take jurisdiction over the
person of a defendant though the summons was served outside of the
city 8 and this would seem to follow front section 27, supra. The summons is a mandate of the court, 7 and, whereas in the former city court
act 8 the legislature was specific in providing for service of the summons, 9
in the new act, section 27 is the"only provision which applies to execution
of mandates Under the former act it was held that a summons could
not be served beyond the confines of the city, 10 the word "city" being
construed to mean and apply to the territory within the city of New
York as constituted prior to June 6th, 1895.11 At such time the city
consisted of the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx. After the
consolidation of the greater city the territorial jurisdiction of the court
remained the same, the county courts of Kings, Queens and Richmond
e.,ercising somewhat similar civil jurisdiction in their respective counties.
in cases involving resident litigants.
The city court of New York is purely a creature of statute and had
no existence under the common law of the State. It is a court of limited
and inferior jurisdiction and it possesss only those powers which are
sSupra note 1. The question here decided was constantly discussed in
the columns of the New York Law Journal prior to the appearance of this
decision and evidently was of considerable importance to New York City
practitioners.
6Liscio v. M. S. Const. Corp., N. Y. L. J., Aug. 19, 1927 (opinion Koch,
J. Bronx Co.) The court held that section 27 of the act authorized the
service of a sunimons issued out of the city court upon the defendant in
Westchester County.
7N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 218.
8L. 1920, ch. 935.
9City Court Act, 1920, §37: "A mandate of the court can be executed
only within the city of New York, except as follows, etc.," (actions merely
for money damages are not within any of the exceptions).
I0 McCann v. Gerding, 29 Misc. 283, 60 N. Y. Supp. 467 (1899); Mehrbach v. Partridge, 9 Misc. 209, 29 N. Y. Supp. 681 (1894); People ex rel.
Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Justices of the City Court of New York, 11 N. Y. Supp.
773 (1890).
"lCity Court Act, 1920. §37 (7).
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conferred upon it by statutory enactment.'2 It has been held that the
jurisdiction of a local court of inferior jurisdiction in the absence of
express statutory authority to the contrary nmust be exercised only within
the locality and its process cannot be executed outside of it."3 Under
the constitution the legislature may establish inferior local courts of civil
and local jurisdiction 2 4 and the mere fact that in the Supreme Court is
vested the general Jurisdiction over causes in law and equity I- does
not prohibit the legislature from giving general jurisdiction to other
tribunals,1 6 but this grant of authority, as heretofore stated, must be
7
express.'
The difficulty encountered in the principal case is one not so much
for judicial, as for legislative, clarification. judge Bijur, in the major
opinion, criticizes the constitutional amendment increasing the powers of
the city court, saying that "it was loosely phrased and ineptly worded and
should be interpreted conservatively, and, so far as possible, in harmony
with existing practice." The same may be said of the act itself as it
presently reads. The draftsman of the act had before him the constitutional amendment which specifically provides that "the city court of the
city of New York is continued and from and after * * * it shall have
the same jurisdiction and- power throughout the city of New York,
* * * as it now possesses within the County of New York and the
County of Bronx," but despite this and the clarity which characterizes
the 1920 act, the present act was drafted so vaguely that undoubtedly
there will arise other questions involving the powers of this important
court.
The soundness of the decision in the principal case cannot be
questioned. The amendment, as the major opinion states, had for its
purposes:
1. To give the city court a constitutional status.
2. To extend its territorial jurisdiction bver the greater city,
22Seabury's City Court Practice, p. 19.
"3Geraty v. Reid, 78 N. Y. 64 (1879); Baird v. Helfer, 12 App. Div. 23,
42 N. Y. Supp. 484 (1896); Ziegler v. Corwin, 12 App. Div. 60, 42 N. Y.
Supp. 858 (1896). "The jurisdiction as confirmed by the amended article
of the constitution, was strictly local in all its aspects; and in the absence
of any evidence in the terms of the instrument to change radically the character of the court and the extent of its jurisdiction, an intent to do so will
not be inferred." Landers v. Staten Island R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 450 (1873).
14N. Y. Const. art. 6, §18.
2
2'
Ibid. §1.
' 6 People ex rel. Ryan v. Greene, 58 N. Y. 295, 301 (1874).
17Supra note 13.
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so that a unified community might have a unified
somewhat the same civil jurisdiction as the county
counties.
3. To relieve the crowded calendars of the
and facilitate trials of actions involving generally
$3,000.

local court of
court of other
supreme court
no more than

"The amendment was intended to keep intact the jurisdiction of the
court but to extend its territorial scope to the limits of the greater city."
This is a clear inference to be drawn from the nature of local and.
inferior courts and from the amendment itself. Before a court can take
jurisdiction of a cause, two essential elements must.exist: 1---cognizance
of the subject matter of the action; 2-jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant. If it is to be held that the city court has jurisdiction
over a defendant because of personal service made anywhere in the
State, then an anomalous as well as unreasonable construction must be
indulged. It would be anomalous in the sense that a purely local court
would have state wide jurisdiction as to persons while, in other respects,
having but limited authority, and unreasonable in that it would compel
non-resident defendants to appear before it to answer in actions which,
perhaps, not only arose without the city of New York but wherein the
plaintiff was also a non-resident. This construction would lend itself
admirably to a legal abuse of process. In Landers v. Staten Island R. R.
Co.B an analogous situation arose. The constitution then in force
declared that the city court of Brooklyn and the other courts named "are
continued with the powers and jurisdiction they now severally have."
A summons was served on the defendant outside of the then existing city
of Brooklyn. and defendant moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of
iurisdiction over its person, since the summons was not served on it
within the city limits. The Court granted the motion speaking quite
caustically of the legislature's failure to make its' meaning clear i" and
stated: "No .thought was had to an extension of the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or permitting it to take cognizance of causes of
action not originating or situated within the city of Brooklyn, or
hauling-men and women from distant parts of the state who have never
been within the limits of the city. within its power, and subjecting them
to its juiisdiction. * * * The authority was to enlarge its jurisdiction
as a local"court, the city court of Brooklyn, not to create a new court
with general.jurisdiction throughout the state." There is ample authority
.1Supra note 13.
1"This could not have been intended under the constitution; and if that
instrument can be so interpreted as to sustain the legislation based upon it,
its framers will ha.av no reason to congratulate themselves upon the precision
and care with v hich they have sought to give expression to and clothe their
i:tent with language.'. Landers -'. Staten Island R. R. Co., supra, at p. 453.
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to support the Landers case. 20 The Court looks with disfavor upon
requiring distant defendants to come to New York. 21
A more serious question is presented by the terminology of the
amendment which provides that the city court shall have "original
jurisdiction concurrent with the supreme court in actions for the recovery
of money only, etc." A superficial examination of the act and constitution
would tend to support the theory that the court's jurisdiction was now
co-extensive with that of the supreme court, subject only to its limited
power over the subject matter of the action. Here, also, the inefficient
drafting of the amendment and act is responsible. But the construction
placed upon this provision in the American Historical Society case seems
amply in point and decisive of the question: what was conferred was
jurisdiction similar to that of the supreme court in like actions limited
of course by the local character of the city court itself.
L. L. W.

A SIGNIFICANT MUNICIPAL BUDGET DECISION.-In October, 1927,
the Board of Estimate and Apportionment of the City of New York
included in the budget an item of $13,000,000.00 "for the 1928 amortization installment on Rapid Transit Corporate Stock-maturing 1929,
1930, 1931." 1
This action was taken pursuant to formal resolutions 2 previously
adopted by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment by virtue of their
20

Hoag v. Lamont, 60 N. Y. 96 (1875); Wheelock v. Lee, 74 N. Y. 497
(1878); Davidsburgh v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 90 N. Y. 529 (1882).
21
Geraty v. Reid, supra note 13.
the redemption of such debt
'Greater New York Charter, §206. "-For
out of said sinking fund there shall be annually included in the budget and
paid into the sinking fund of the City of New York herein created, an amount
to be estimated and certified by the comptroller, and to be by the - board
of estimate and apportionment inserted in the budget for each year,--";
Sec. 226, "-The said board shall annually - make a budget of the
amounts estimated to be required to pay expenses of--city-. In order
to enable said board to make such budget,--the heads of departmentsshall send to the board of estimate and apportionment an estimate ill
writing-."
2
October 27, 1927. "Resolved, By the Board of Estimate and Apportionthat
requisitions of the Board of Transportationpursuant tomentthe term of the corporate stock thereby authorized, to the extent of Fiftytwo million dollars, now unissued, shall be four (4) years from the date
of issue-";
Resolved, That the Board of Estimate and Apportionment hereby authorizes
the Comptroller of the City of New York to issue and sell, before December

